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CAN BASEL III PREVENT FUTURE FINANCIAL 
 CRISIS? 
 
Ass. Prof., PhD Violeta Madzova 
University “Goce Delcev” - Stip, Macedonia  
 
 
Abstract 
The financial sector is crucial for the smooth functioning of the economy. 
For this reason, the authorities use financial regulation as a means to ensure the 
stability of the banking system and to correct those ‘market failures’ that would 
otherwise threaten the solidity of financial institutions.  
Recently introduced Basel III on the  new bank capital and liquidity 
standards,  (that is going to be implemented gradually starting from 2013 till 
2019)  is changing the way that banks address the management of risk and 
finance. The new regime seeks much greater integration of the finance and risk 
management functions.  
In general ,  the regulations on capital requirements  represent a major 
step forward in strengthening financial sector stability.  
However the implementation of Basel III might   be followed with certain 
risks, which might have negative impact on  financial stability and progress of 
the economy.  
The paper highlights the positive but as well as the negative implications 
of BASEL III requirements that need to be addressed and analyzed before its 
practical implementation. 
The paper refers mostly to the to restrict access to credit, by creating 
tighter credit conditions for small and medium-sized firms, and for start-up 
businesses which will directly affect SME development .  
The tightened criteria for BASEL III might have certain negative impact on 
economic growth in the medium to long term period. It is also important to 
mentioned that so called “Shadow banking (such as insurance firms, hedge and 
pension funds, and investment banks) played a central role in the latest financial 
crisis and has become a major  provider of credit.  
However, the Basel Committee’s proposals do not concern this 
increasingly important sector of the financial system; this means that Basel III 
affords shadow banking a competitive advantage and is likely to incentivize risk 
taking in this sector. Moreover, in the event of an insolvency crisis in the non-
bank financial sector, the banking system will be unlikely to remain immune to 
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the risk of contagion.  
 
The global financial and economic crisis has provided an 
opportunity for fundamental restructuring of the approach related to risk 
and regulation in the financial sector. 
Recently introduced Basel III on the new bank capital and liquidity 
standards, (that is going to be implemented gradually starting from 2013 
till 2019) is changing the way that banks address the management of risk 
and finance. The new regime seeks much greater integration of the 
finance and risk management functions by  raising  capital requirements 
for banks and  strengthening the stability of the global financial system. 
According to the suggested new rules
55
: 
• The definition of capital will be narrowed to common shares and 
retained earnings -the Tier 1 capital requirement ratio will increase from 
4.0% to 6.0%. 
• The required ratio of equity to risk-weighted assets will rise from 
2.0% to 4.5%. Under Basel III, equity over risk-weighted assets will be 
considered as the benchmark ratio, replacing the Tier 1 capital ratio. 
• The new rules will introduce a ‘capital conservation’ buffer that 
will have to be above 2.5% and be met with common equity; in periods 
of stress (when the banks’ capital ratio falls below 7.0%), financial 
institutions will be authorised to draw upon this capital buffer by 
curtailing the distribution of dividends or bonuses. These measures are 
supposed to address the problem whereby, under Basel II, capital 
requirements were inadequate to withstand significant losses. 
• The Basel Committee also proposes to set up a counter-cyclical 
capital buffer of between 0% and 2.5%,to be in effect only in periods of 
excessive credit growth (based on the national regulators’ discretion). 
The goal of this rule is to correct the pro-cyclicality of Basel II, 
particularly in periods of economic expansion. In addition, the proposed 
regulations aim to strengthen this system by introducing a leverage ratio 
of 3.0%: in any case, the ratio of capital to total assets will have to be 
above this threshold. 
As per financial stability the BASEL III introduces two new 
                                                 
55  Pierre-Etienne Chabanel – “Implementing Basel III “ pg. 12 
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liquidity standards as follows
56
:  
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (“LCR”): intended to measure a 
bank’s ability to access funding for a 30 day period of acute market 
stress. Banks will be required to have a segregated stock of highly liquid 
and unencumbered assets that are at least equal to its estimated “net cash 
outflows” for a thirty day period during a time of acute liquidity stress.  
The Net Stable Funding Ratio (“NSFR”): with a purpose to limit 
short-term liquidity mismatches and encourages the use of longer term 
funding. A bank is required to have stable funding sources in excess of 
the amount of stable funding it would likely need over a one-year period 
of extended market stress. This is a longer term structural ratio that 
covers a bank’s entire balance sheet as well as certain off-balance sheet 
commitments.  
Despite the fact that Basel III provides for long implementation 
periods for these ratios, banks will need to be in a position to report data 
regarding liquidity by the beginning of the relevant observation period 
(which is January 1, 2012 for both the LCR and the NSFR). Banks may 
also be subject to market pressure to comply with the liquidity ratios 
even before the deadlines set out in Basel III. 
In general, an effective implementation of Basel III  is intended to 
demonstrate to regulators, customers, and shareholders that the bank is 
recovering well from the global banking crisis of 2008. A speedy imple-
mentation  in the period of  2013-2019 year ,  suppose to  contribute to a 
bank’s competitiveness by delivering better management insight into the 
business, allowing it to take advantage of future opportunities. It is no 
doubt that the  overall new design for capital and liquidity  requirements  
is well-intended, and might be more prudent than previous  ones within 
the  international banking standards. However,  it seems that the Basel III 
Accord misses the main lesson of the global financial crisis: Over reli-
ance on regulatory structures decreases incentives for financial institu-
tions to be more aware about the risk taking and self-provision of liquidi-
ty and financial stability. 
Most of the analysts of the recent global crisis agree on the fact that 
                                                 
56  A D&B Special Report “The Business Impact of ‘Basel III’, , pg 7 
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the old BASEL II requirements and rules practically increased the risk in 
the system, instructing the banks to increase the less-risky assets, which 
make them eager to pack up toxic mortgage loans into securities which   
required significantly lower capital to be held in reserve than the toxic 
loans required. 
What brought banks to their knees wasn't direct exposure to sub-
prime loans, but exposure to triple-A-rated debt backed by pools of such 
loans, debt which turned out not to be risk-free at all.
57
 Therefore , ones 
can say that BASEL III doesn’t possesses the strength to prevent the fu-
ture crisis, but even might cause further problems which directly or indi-
rectly might create preconditions for another financial and economic cri-
sis. In the following there some observations related to the weakness of 
the BASEL III related to the resistance to the financial crisis:  
1. Basel III  doesn't address, the calculation of risk-weights which 
turns out to be the principal contribution of Basel II to the last financial 
crisis.  
In fact, the whole concept of risk weighting is based  on the idea 
that some assets are riskier than others and those banks should hold more 
capital against risky assets than they do against much safer assets, as the  
loans to the governments are. Risk, moreover, was calculated primarily 
by reference to the rating assigned by one of the recognized ratings 
agencies. The intentions of the  Basel II reform was to discourage banks 
from lending to risky enterprises, and to encourage the accumulation of 
apparently risk-free assets 
That makes a certain amount of sense, but there are some main 
problems with it: 
 It’s backwards-looking: it considers that the level of the risk as-
sessed at certain securities will continue to be the same in the future, 
i.e.(the securities which have been risky in the past will continue to be 
risky  in the future) which is not necessarily true.  
 Basel III certainly keeps the backward looking risk weighting 
approach, but it did dramatically increase the risk weighting on the assets 
that brought down  many big banks in the previous crisis  (CDOs of 
                                                 
57 Anthony Randazzo : “Basel III Misses the Point; Bankers Will Still Cheat the Rules” , 
1 pg. 
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ABS). And, probably more importantly in the long run, it removed the 
major source of arbitrage under Basel II, the disparity in treatment be-
tween securitisations in the trading book and the banking book.  
 The BASEL III concept and its requirement are easy to be mis-
used. Namely, the consequence of this Basel II reform was to discourage 
banks from lending to risky enterprises, and to encourage the accumula-
tion of apparently risk- free assets. This was a primary contributor to the 
structured finance craze, as securitisation was a way to “manufacture” 
apparently risk-free assets out of risky pools. All this brought banks to 
collapse and illiquidity.  
Since it did not change this risk-weighting, Basel III effectively 
doubles the problems which were indentifies at Basel II. Banks will need 
to hold more common equity than ever—against their risk-weighted 
assets. That will  increase  their  incentive to find low-risk-weight assets 
with some return, since these assets can be leveraged much more highly 
than risky assets. Furthermore, lending to governments still carries a risk-
weight of zero. So, one result of Basel III could be to encourage banks to 
increase their lending to governments at the margins of zero-risk-weight 
status. 
2. The new system of BASEL III is overly dependent on the 
decisions of the regulators. While banks will have to keep a minimum of 
4.5% of common equity and 6% of Tier 1 capital, they will also be 
subject to a 2.5% “capital conservation buffer. This buffer will be 
activated even when the bank is in good times, so to assure the bank’s 
financial stability during financial crises. 
However, within BASEL III  there's no objective trigger point , in 
terms of time  when banks will need to build up the buffer and when they 
will be allowed to draw on that capital if needed. This decision will be 
left up to regulators in each individual country. Trusting regulators to act 
on their authority takes some willpower.  
For the concept which is intending to prevent future bank failures as 
BASEL III intends to be,  it is too gullible or naïve to believe and left 
only to the  regulators to decide and precise the time  for when banks 
should hold more capital or even  not. More important, the new 
regulatory scheme could fail in several ways.  
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The sad truth is that there is no set of rules that will ensure the sol-
vency of the banking system, or its resiliency in a crisis. In a competitive 
market, banks have no choice but to seize any available opportunity to 
increase their return on capital. That means that regulators need to be dy-
namic in their response to changes in the marketplace, and anything that 
appears to generate returns with low risk should raise a red flag. Banks 
should be able to set their own capital requirements, but if the govern-
ment is going to do it for them, then a single, simple, significant reserve 
level would avoid depending on regulators to time the market and help 
investors more easily understand the safety and soundness of banking in-
stitutions.  
3. The rules and target given for the  risk weights are pretty  
arbitrary and no special arguments is given about it. In fact it is not 
explained how it was calculated and whether equity to risk-weighted 
assets of   4.5% is high enough? Or whether the  2.5% buffer will hold up 
in financial storm?  
There different opinion about it .  The Shadow Financial Regulatory 
Committee
58
, based in Washington, DC, released a statement arguing that 
the minimum common equity ratio was too low, since most of the 
financial institutions  were over or at that ratio during the crisis.  
However,  Germany was voicing concerns that proposed levels were too 
high, which is understandable, as Deutsche Bank had one of the lowest 
capital reserves right after the financial crisis . Further still, the capital 
ratio requirements are going to be relatively meaningless if the assets 
they're measured against get overvalued. This means ensuring proper 
accounting methods, which the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
has been grappling with, but failed to get right during the crisis.Even if 
there was a good defense for the agreed upon percentages, the choice of 
arbitrary risk weights is not efficient tool that doesn’t seem appropriate 
for the dynamic nature of the global banking industry.  
4. The criticism on the BASEL II complexity is even exceeded 
with” four layers of capital requirements “indicated in BASEL III. It 
should be remembered that the failure of capital requirements wasn’t that 
they were set too low, but that they were too static and got out-navigated 
                                                 
58 Slovik, P. and B. Cournède (2011), “Macroeconomic Impact of Basel III”,pg 4 
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by a market that took advantage of the over complex nature of the old 
system to build up the  risk right in front of the  regulators. 
5. A new regulatory scheme reduces bank profitability, creating a 
fundamental misunderstanding of how a competitive economy works.  
Regulation, by erecting barriers to entry, reduces competition. Those 
banks who are able to meet the regulatory requirements should be even 
more profitable than before because of lower competition. This means 
that, the banking sector as a whole might be less profitable under Basel 
III than it was before, but only if less capital in aggregate was allocated 
to the banking sector.  
Individual banks will still need to attract investors—more common-
equity investors than ever, in fact—and those investors will demand a 
competitive rate of return. No bank regulation can change that. 
6. Basel III (like BASEL II) is a risk-based capital regime. 
Alongside reviewing capital strategies, banks should remember 
regulatory anticipations of continued improvements to risk management 
and the risk models supporting the capital calculations. Capital is only 
one lever to avoid future financial crises – regulators also continue to 
focus on risk management and governance underpinning a robust 
financial sector. Institutions that do not show a similar focus are likely to 
find themselves subject to even greater regulatory scrutiny.Even well-
capitalised banks in Europe and the US could find some of the 
requirements demanding. The result could be reduced credit availability 
or increased cost of credit .  
7. Therefore the new rules from BASELIII might force certain 
overleveraged and smaller banks to restrict access to credit, at least 
temporarily. In particular, this is likely to create tighter credit conditions 
for small and medium-sized firms, and for start-up businesses. It would 
have bad impact on the banking and business sector in transitional 
economies, where the small and medium enterprises are the driving 
wheel of the economy, while the banks are practicing conservative 
banking with limited or no instruments for risk transfer or hedging. 
8. New rules on trade financing are likely to result in tighter trade 
credit conditions, encouraging companies to use less secure instruments.  
In fact , Basel Committee is proposing to increase the risk-
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weighting attached to all off-balance sheet items from the current 20%  to 
100% or  their capital for asset-backed loans  will be increased five times 
more. As  the definition of off-balance sheet items include standby letters 
of credit and trade letters of credit (among others), the risk-weighting of 
traditional trade finance instruments (which represent around 30% of 
world trade) is set to increase significantly as well. The implication of 
this proposed rule is that banks will face a five-fold increase in the cost 
of trade finance. This will leave financial institutions with two options: 
either they will pass the costs onto their customers, or they will have to 
focus on other, more profitable activities and reduce their trade credit 
exposure, thus restricting access to letters of credit. In either case, trade 
financing conditions are likely to affect mostly the business with 
exposure to emerging markets, as letters of credit are usually employed 
in trade transactions with firms based in developing economies.  So,  the 
risk that this five-fold increase in the credit conversion factor for trade 
credit instruments might significantly restrict access to trade finance and 
therefore  negative knock-on effects on world trade. 
9. The last , but may be the most important concern is that Basel III 
leaves unanswered questions about non-bank financial institutions, as 
they fall beyond the scope of the new regulations. Shadow banking (such 
as insurance firms, hedge and pension funds, and investment banks) 
played a central role in the latest financial crisis and has become a major 
provider of credit. However, the Basel Committee’s proposals do not 
concern this increasingly important sector of the financial system. This 
means that Basel III affords shadow banking a competitive advantage 
and is likely to incentivise risk taking in this sector, which can be easily 
transferred over the banking industry and create the condition for the new 
financial crisis. 
 
Conclusion 
The implementation of Basel III might   be followed with certain 
risks, which might have negative impact on financial stability and 
progress of the economy. The tightened criteria for BASEL III might 
have certain negative impact on economic growth in the medium to long 
term period. It is also important to mention that so called “Shadow 
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banking (such as insurance firms, hedge and pension funds, and 
investment banks) played a central role in the latest financial crisis and 
has become a major provider of credit.  
In fact Basel III affords shadow banking a competitive advantage 
and is likely to incentivize risk taking in this sector. Moreover, in the 
event of an insolvency crisis in the non-bank financial sector, the banking 
system will be unlikely to remain immune to the risk of contagion.  
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